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INTRODUCTION 
 
here is an abundance of published literature which has attempted 
to assess the impact of Conservative industrial relations legislation 
on trade unions (for the most renowned see: Elias and Ewing 1985; 
Steele 1990; Brown and Wadhwani 1990; Elgar and Simpson 1993; Miller and 
Steele 1993; Dunn and Metcalf 1996; Undy et al. 1996; Brown, Deakin and Ryan 
1997).  As well as this research, the author draws on recent empirical work of his 
own.  Using data derived from interviews with senior officials, national officials 
and shop stewards it will examine the impact of industrial action ballots on the 
procedures, practices and behaviour of trade unions and, more specifically, 
whether workers under the new balloting system seemed more inclined to vote 
to avoid confrontation with employers and, in so doing, took a less conflictual 
and more accommodating stance than would have been the case under the old 
legislative provisions.   
T
The expectation was that the empowerment of the individual member 
would result in more moderate decision–making. This paper draws on empirical 
data gathered from an in-depth analysis of seven case study trade unions: 
Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), Electrical, Electronic 
Telecommunications and Plumbing Union (EETPU, now part of AMICUS), Civil 
and Public Services Union (CPSA, now part of the Public and Commercial 
Services Union (PCSA)), Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and 
Firemen (ASLEF), Rail and Maritime Trade Union (RMT), Bakers Food and 
Allied Trade Union (BFAWU) and National Association of Teachers in Further 
and Higher Education (NATFHE).  The research also involved the execution of 
101 interviews, which included trade union officials, members, the 
Commissioner for the Rights of Trade Union Members (CROTUM), the 
Certification Officer (CO) and the Deputy General Secretary of the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC).  
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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s successive Conservative 
governments introduced legislation regulating the internal affairs of trade 
unions.  Conservative trade union law constituted a fundamental change from 
previous strictures in relation to the scope and methods of legislative 
intervention in union government (Wedderburn 1991: 203; Fredman 1992: 25; 
Fosh et al. 1993: 22; Hendy 1993: 16; Miller and Steele 1993: 224; Martin et al. 1995: 
146).  The essence of the legislation was not novel, for traces of it are to be found 
in the Donovan Commission in 1966, Barbara Castle’s ‘In Place of Strife’ January 
1969, the Industrial Relations Act 1971 and the American Landum-Griffin Act 
1959.  Nevertheless, this legislation was a significant development, because for 
the first time it sought to impose a prescriptive template outlining in detail how 
unions should conduct their affairs (Undy et al. 1996: 75).  The legislation, which 
despite the election of two successive Labour governments since 1997 remains 
little changed, now intervenes in union affairs by prescribing secret ballots for 
elections, union political funds and industrial action.  It also provides the 
individual member with an extensive array of rights, which they can enforce 
against their union.  The legal changes sought to make trade union governance 
more responsive to the wishes of the membership and to limit the permissible 
range of industrial action (Democracy in Trade Unions 1983: 1, 17).  The legal 
changes pertaining to industrial action introduced by successive British 
Conservative Governments 1979-1997 were consistent with the changes in 
broader neo-liberal shifts throughout many Anglo American regulatory 
frameworks.  For many, the changes in Britain during the 1980s and early 1990s 
appear to be a harmonization with US, Canadian and perhaps Australian 
regulatory frameworks rather than European Union countries.  The policy of 
Conservative governments towards trade unions was exceptional in a European 
context.  No other country has regarded it as necessary to make such a significant 
legislative intrusion into internal union affairs.  The cry for “union democracy” 
has developed special significance for the leading British political parties (Lynk 
2002).  New Labour’s adoption of the Conservative model of stringent legislation 
governing trade unions has become a noteworthy feature of Labour policy.  It 
has been remarked that powerful trade unions have no place in New Labour’s 
vision of the labour market, the employment relationship or society (Smith and 
Morton 2006).       
In the Employment Act 1980 the scope of lawful picketing was 
diminished, with picketing protected only at a striker’s own place of work 
(section 12).  The Act also removed many of the immunities for secondary action 
(section 17).  The Employment Act 1982 removed the immunity of trade unions 
from liability in tort, established by the Trade Disputes Act 1906, allowing 
employers to proceed against unions, not merely individual union officers, in 
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relation to unlawful industrial action (section 15).  The Act also extended the 
power of the employer to dismiss strikers or those taking part in industrial action 
(section 9). 
  The introduction of the Trade Union Act 1984 marked a significant stage 
in the Conservative government’s attempts to hamper the ability of trade unions 
to engage in industrial action.  The Act prescribed detailed requirements which 
had to be satisfied for lawful industrial action to be taken.  First, it required the 
holding of a ballot prior to industrial action as a precondition for obtaining legal 
immunity from civil actions (section 10 (3)(a).  Secondly, the result of the ballot 
had to be a majority in favour of the industrial action (section 10 (3)(b).  The third 
requirement of a ballot was that the first authorisation or endorsement of the 
tortious act must have taken place after, but within four weeks of the ballot 
(section 10 (3)(c).  Where the ballot was held on more than one day, the date of 
the ballot was treated as being the last of those days (section 10(5).  Finally, a 
valid ballot needed to comply with a list of requirements contained in section 11.  
Section 11 (1) carefully defined the electorate as all those members it is 
reasonable for the union at the time of the ballot to believe will be called upon to 
take strike or other industrial action.  No other persons were to be allowed to 
vote in the ballot (s.11 (1) (b)). The section also covered the balloting process.  
Section 11 (3) required that the manner of voting must be by the marking of a 
ballot paper; a show of hands at a branch meeting was not acceptable.  The Act 
provided that the member must be given the opportunity to vote by post or at 
the workplace (section 11(6)).  The ballot had to be conducted in secret (section 
11(7)), members had to be allowed to vote without interference or constraint 
from the union (section 11(5)) and without incurring any direct costs to 
themselves (section 11(5). 
  Section 11 (4) related to the wording of the ballot paper itself, which was 
to be drafted so as to encourage members to vote against industrial action, the so 
called ‘industrial health warning’.  The question required members to indicate 
whether they were prepared to take part in industrial action involving a breach 
of their employment contracts.  Aside from having to obtain a ‘yes or no’ answer, 
the union was able to phrase the question how it pleased and the words ‘breach 
of contract’ did not need to appear on the ballot paper, though the union had to 
make clear that the action would constitute such a breach (Undy et al. 1996: 125).  
Further changes in the law on industrial action balloting were 
subsequently made in the Employment Act 1988.  Firstly, it introduced the right 
for a union member to restrain his/her union legally from unlawfully calling 
industrial action (section 1).  Secondly, the form and content of the ballot paper 
were to be subject to more detailed regulation.  In particular section 11 of the 
Trade Union Act 1984 was amended (schedule 3(8)(c).  The ballot paper had to 
contain the following prescribed statement which could not be qualified or 
commented upon by anything elsewhere on the ballot paper: 
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If you take part in strike or other industrial action, you may be in breach of your 
contract of employment. 
 
Third, the 1988 Act required industrial action to be supported by a 
majority in a separate ballot in each separate workplace (section 17).  The 1988 
Act also made it ‘unjustifiable’ for unions to discipline members for refusing to 
take part in industrial action (section 3).  The courts were empowered to award 
up to £30,000 to a union member for such infringements (section 5(8)).  
The Employment Act 1990 included an array of provisions designed to 
curb industrial action:  removing immunity for all forms of secondary action 
(section 4); widening the range of persons who could render a union liable in tort 
for illegal action (section 6); tightening the requirements for repudiation of illegal 
action, which could enable unions to escape liability section 6(5); permitting 
employers to dismiss selectively employees taking part in union action (section 
9) and widening the extent to which a union could be vicariously liable for the 
acts of any groups, including an official of the union (section 6(3)).  This raised 
the possibility that industrial action organised by a group acting outside the 
constitution of the union, but including an official of the union, could be held to 
be the action of the union. 
The Conservatives were particularly concerned with the problem of 
illegal industrial action.  The predominant view of the then Conservative 
government was that taking illegal action did not necessarily reflect the 
breakdown within trade unions of internal authority.  They believed that 
although a strike might not be authorised by a union, it might nevertheless be in 
a union’s interests.  With little supporting evidence, they claimed that there had 
been cases where trade unions turned a blind eye to or had secretly encouraged 
illegal action (Unofficial Action and the Law, 1989, para. 1.13). 
Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 introduced  
further amendments to the law pertaining to industrial action ballots, requiring 
all industrial action ballots to be fully postal, rather than workplace (section 17); 
requiring the appointment of an independent scrutineer to oversee industrial 
action ballots (section 20); an obligation on a union to give written notice to each 
employer being balloted (section 21); and giving individuals the right to bring 
‘cease and desist’ applications, seeking an injunction to restrain unlawful 
industrial action which would affect the supply of goods or services to that 
individual (section 22).  This cause of action would apply even if the members 
themselves for whom the democratic rule was introduced had no complaint.  The 
Conservatives were convinced that if unions faced the prospect of unlimited 
fines and sequestration of their assets for contempt if injunctions were flouted, 
this would discourage them from engaging in militant trade union activity.  The 
intent was to make union bureaucrats reluctant to step beyond the immunities 
and risk financial damage to the union Dunn and Metcalf (1996: 70).  
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CASE STUDY DISCUSSION 
 
Table 1 compares the methods for calling industrial action used by each 
of the seven case-study unions before and after the Trade Union Act 1984 and 
Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993. 
 
Table 1: Changes in the Trigger for Industrial Action by Union 
 
Union:  Trigger for Industrial Action 
 
 Pre 1984: 
 
Post 1984: Post 1993: 
BFAWU Secret postal ballot Mixture of secret 
postal ballots and 
workplace ballots 
Mixture of secret 
postal ballots and 
workplace ballots 
ASLEF NEC decision Workplace ballots Secret postal ballot 
RMT NEC decision Workplace ballots Secret postal ballot 
TGWU NEC decision and 
workplace votes 
using a show of 
hands 
Workplace ballots Secret postal ballot 
EETPU Secret postal ballot Workplace ballot Secret postal ballot 
NATFHE Branch ballot Workplace ballot Secret postal ballot 
CPSA Sectional ballot Workplace ballot Secret postal ballot 
 
Prior to the introduction of Conservative legislation, each of the case-
study unions had its own method for the calling of industrial action.  This had 
been part of their respective constitutions for many years and could be located in 
the rule-book.  Since the introduction of Conservative legislation all but the 
BFAWU have moved towards a system of strictly secret postal ballots.  The 
Conservative legislation requiring the holding of secret ballots prior to engaging 
in industrial action resulted in some significant changes to the procedures of 
some trade unions.   
Firstly, the legislation required fundamental changes in ASLEF, the RMT 
and the TGWU in order for these unions to successfully avoid litigation.  In these 
three unions the power to call industrial action originally lay with the executive, 
there was no duty on the executive to consult the union membership before 
undertaking strike action.  As we have seen, the RMT, TGWU and ASLEF all 
eventually took the necessary steps to bring their arrangements into line with 
legal requirements. 
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Secondly, some unions which did ballot their members were also 
required to make changes at various junctures in order to bring their procedures 
into line with the requirements of legislation.  NATFHE, for example, 
traditionally held branch votes.  When the Trade Union Act 1984 was introduced 
it moved to secret postal ballots.  In respect of the CPSA, the union had 
traditionally held sectional ballots.  On the introduction of Trade Union Act 1984 
it also adopted secret postal ballots.  In respect to the EETPU, the union 
traditionally used secret postal ballots.  It moved to workplace ballots on the 
introduction of Trade Union Act 1984, but reverted to postal ballots on the 
introduction of Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993.  The 
BFAWU traditionally used secret postal ballots.  However, since 1984 it has used 
a mixture of workplace and postal ballots, the workplace ballots now being held 
are in contravention of the legal requirements.  
Third, the case-study unions encountered a number of challenges, 
relating to the holding of industrial action ballots and the law surrounding them.  
A major problem was the inflexible and technical nature of the balloting rules 
with which trade unions needed to comply.  The complex legal requirements 
meant trade unions could easily fall foul of the law hampering their ability to call 
industrial action lawfully.  This viewpoint was most prominently expressed by 
officials in ASLEF, the RMT, the TGWU, the EETPU and NATFHE.  The complex 
nature of the law also provided opportunities for employers and dissident 
members to challenge the balloting process (Elgar and Simpson 1993). 
The legislation resulted in all the case-study unions, with the exception of 
the BFAWU, laying down detailed procedures on the process of organising 
industrial action.  Senior officials of trade unions sent out the message to lower-
level officials and committees that if the advice was not followed, it was 
impossible to comply with the law and organise a lawful and effective campaign 
of industrial action.  Due to the technical nature of the balloting process, shop 
stewards needed support and guidance from national officials and legal officers.   
The informants from the case-study unions indicated that trade unions 
attempted to comply with the legal obligations surrounding industrial action.  In 
particular, senior trade union officials tried to ensure that illegal action was not 
taken (Lockwood 2000).  However, illegal action was prominent in disputes on 
the London Underground involving both ASLEF and RMT members.  Moreover, 
survey evidence suggests that the Conservative legislation did not succeed in one 
of its primary targets, the eradication of illegal industrial action (Millward et al. 
1992; Elgar and Simpson 1993; Elgar 1997; Brown, Deakin and Ryan 1997); 
however, it is apparent that the law has contributed to a significant decline in 
illegal action (see below, p.29). 
The Conservative legislation relating to industrial action was also used by 
some trade union leaders to justify changes in union procedures that secured 
increased power for those in control of union affairs, at the expense of other 
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groups, committees or officials.  The leadership of the TGWU and the EETPU 
used the law pertaining to industrial action to justify the introduction of 
procedures that centralised power within the unions, undermining the 
traditional autonomy of shop stewards.  Shop stewards could not determine the 
timing of ballots, and they were required to confer with senior officials prior to 
taking a particular course of action.  
The decision of the respective leaderships to centralise decision-making, 
taking authority away from shop stewards, was made despite the fact that the 
law demanded this only in exceptional circumstances.  In the case of Tanks and 
Drums v TGWU 1992 ICR 1, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the law 
allowed unions to leave the final decision about resort to industrial action to the 
union official involved.  Moreover, the centralisation of decision-making was 
implemented in the 1980s, at a time when bargaining arrangements were 
becoming fragmented, placing more responsibility on local officials.  It could 
therefore be argued that the leaderships of the TGWU and EETPU embarked on 
a process of centralisation at a time of countervailing tendencies, that is, during a 
period when the level of pay-bargaining became more decentralised, in response 
to employer-led policies.   
The degree to which decision-making was devolved to lower-level 
officials in relation to industrial bargaining was an area of substantial difference 
between the trade unions.  The BFAWU, ASLEF and the RMT decentralised 
bargaining, increasing the power of shop stewards.  These developments can be 
explained by various contextual factors, including: internal reform of union 
government, leadership policies and changes in the arrangements for collective 
bargaining.  In the cases of both ASLEF and the RMT, the changes have bolstered 
the position of local officials in respect of the bargaining process.  A similar 
position is also detectable in the BFAWU, where bargaining has also become 
more devolved.  In the BFAWU, the RMT and ASLEF there has been a much 
greater degree of decentralisation and autonomy for branches, as a result of the 
organisational change that has taken place.  This contrasts with developments in 
the TGWU, EEPTU and CPSA central control of bargaining strategy, tactics and 
sanctions by the national leadership was viewed as necessary in order to ensure 
consistency in representation amongst trade groups, to reduce the possibility of 
‘maverick’ local officials embarking on a bargaining agenda of their own, and to 
ensure compliance with legal requirements in respect of balloting.  The latter was 
regarded as important not only in a strict legal sense, but also to safeguard the 
financial position of the union, since balloting and legal sanctions could be costly.  
At a time when trade unions were faced with financial difficulties associated 
with membership decline this caused the leadership of the TGWU, EETPU and 
the CPSA to be very sensitive to the balloting legislation (Undy et al. 1996:  228).  
In respect of NATFHE, the position differed between sections of the union.  In 
the FE sector the collective bargaining process became more devolved, while in 
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the HE sector it remained centralised.  This was mainly due to employer policies 
in respect to collective bargaining.  The centralisation that occurred might be 
regarded as somewhat surprising.  This is because during the period under 
review the level of pay bargaining became more decentralized, in response to 
employer-led policies.  The changes that occurred within the respective trade 
unions can therefore be explained by the fact that each union was starting from a 
different contextual base. 
The technical nature of the balloting rules, the financial expense of the 
balloting procedure, the pressure management could place on employees not to 
engage in industrial action, and the ability and willingness of employers to 
challenge perceived breaches of the balloting process were emphasised as 
harmful consequences for trade unions of the requirement to ballot on industrial 
action (Brown and Wadhwani 1990; Elgar and Simpson 1993; Undy et al. 1996; 
Elgar 1997).  These administrative and legal factors acted as centralising 
pressures, promoting oligarchy within some trade unions and subverting 
democracy.  This was contrary to the Conservative rhetoric that the legal 
measures surrounding industrial action balloting were designed to increase 
democracy (Democracy in Trade Unions 1983). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
However, overall, the case-study trade unions appeared to have coped 
with the legal, financial and administrative burdens surrounding industrial 
action ballots.  An analysis of interviews, conference reports and NEC minutes 
revealed a significant shift in the attitude of ASLEF, the RMT and the TGWU 
towards the concept of balloting before industrial action.  At the time legislation 
on industrial action ballots was introduced, and for several years after, the stance 
taken by officials and members in these unions was confrontational.  Activists 
argued for the retention of the status quo and for refusal to comply with 
legislation. 
This fighting stance has gradually ebbed away, to the extent that the 
principle of holding a secret postal ballot before industrial action is now taken for 
granted in all cases.    Indeed, the following statement by John Monks (the then 
General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress), made at the ASLEF annual 
conference sums up the current position on the concept of industrial action 
ballots: 
 
It must be recognised that such laws have proved popular. No union leader 
would dare go anywhere near a group of workers and say we are not having 
ballots before strikes.  The fact is that prior to the introduction of the legislation 
many unions did not have them before; no one can take that away from what the 
law achieved (ASLEF Conference Proceedings 1999). 
Lockwood   43 
Despite the above it should be noted that as far as trade unions were 
concerned, Conservative legislation was considered to have had a damaging 
impact on union power, inhibiting trade union behaviour.  However, it was 
asserted that the law alone was not responsible for this state of affairs, that the 
hostile economic conditions were important factors.  The apparent success of the 
Conservative legislation could not be seen in isolation from the rise in 
unemployment and from changes to the structure of labour and product markets 
which occurred at this time, both in Britain and other western advanced  
capitalist economies.    
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